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Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the understanding self-organization in collective action pro-
cesses are discussed from a complexity theory perspective. It is argued that complexity researchers 
can learn from Ostrom’s theory building process, as well her conceptualization of the conditions 
of self-organization in the management of common-pool resources. Her focus on self-organization 
helps rectify the problems with the assumption in the mainstream policy analysis that policy pro-
cesses can be explained with external causes. The conceptual problems in her utility maximizing 
rational actor assumption and the potential for conceptual advancements in her recognition of com-
plexity concepts are discussed. It is argued that Ostrom’s conceptual framework is sophisticated, 
but it lacks a dynamic understanding of the micro–macro relationships in complex governance 
systems, and that complexity theory offers the conceptual tools to remedy this problem.
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Complexity theory concepts like self-organization can help us better understand gov-
ernance processes. Self-organization is not original to complexity theory; the concept has 
a long history and it has been used by other theorists as well. It is important to trace the lin-
eage of the concept and acknowledge the contributions of others, so that the contributions 
of complexity theory can be distinguished. In this paper, I focus on the works of the late 
Elinor Ostrom, not only to recognize her contributions, which are substantial, and show 
how complexity theorists can learn from them, but also to highlight the shortcomings in 
her conceptualizations and point to the areas in which complexity theorists can offer better 
conceptualizations. 
Ostrom’s primary contribution is her demonstration that self-organization happens 
under specific conditions and within specific domains in collective action processes. 
She and her colleagues conceptualized and empirically verified the conditions of self- 
organization particularly in the management of common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, 
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2005, 2007a, 2009; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). Ostrom and her colleagues ob-
serve that self-organization happens in structured environments. The idea that self- 
organizational ability of a system depends on external boundary conditions is not alien to 
complexity researchers (e.g., Moreno & Ruiz-Mirazo, 2007), but they do not elaborate on 
the implications of this idea for complex governance systems/networks. Ostrom and her 
colleagues conceptualized and empirically verified the structural characteristics that en-
able, or hamper, self-organizational dynamics in collective action processes. 
Ostrom’s conceptualizations have shortcomings, as well as strengths. Her insti-
tutional analysis and development framework (Ostrom, 2005, 2007a) has its roots in 
the core assumptions of rational choice theory. Although she distanced herself from 
some of the assumptions of this theory, her continued commitment to its assumption 
that actors in collective action processes are rational utility maximizers creates con-
ceptual problems. This assumption is the basis of her static conceptualization of the 
conditions of self- organization in common-pool resource systems. She recognized the 
contributions of complexity theory concepts and adopted some of them in her works. 
In this paper I will elaborate on the problems the rational choice assumptions create in 
Ostrom’s conceptualizations, as well as the potential for conceptual advancements her 
recognition of complexity concepts generates. 
1. A Brief History of Self-Organization
The roots of Ostrom’s and complexity theorists’ thinking of self-organization can be 
found in the philosophical proposition that events and actions do not require external driv-
ers, or hierarchically superior forces, to happen; they can happen for internal reasons, driven 
by the internal dynamics of systems (Göktug˘ Morçöl, 2012a, p. 93). Since the Aristotle’s 
teleological proposition that causes of events in nature are in their final purposes (Bogen, 
1995, p. 868), philosophers and scientists debated whether events are caused internally or 
externally. The Newtonian scientific understanding, which emerged in the 17th century, 
was based on the notion that natural events are caused by external factors (Göktug˘ 
Morçöl, 2002, pp. 13–17). This Newtonian understanding was countered by Kant’s argu-
ment that organismic behaviors were driven by their “inner teleology” in the 18th century 
(Taylor, 2001, pp. 84–93). In the 19th century, in response to Auguste Comte’s argument 
that external forces cause social events, phenomenologists argued that in order to under-
stand social events properly, researchers have to understand the inner worlds of human 
beings (Göktug˘ Morçöl, pp. 163–166). The logical positivists of the early 20th century 
refined the notion of external causation and made it the core of their vision for scientific 
explanation. The notion of self-causation, and self-organization, gained some popularity 
again in the middle of the 20th century, as general systems theory, cybernetic studies, 
mathematical models of neural networks, and the models of the nervous system adopted 
and refined it (Capra, 1996, p. 22). 
Complexity theorists made two significant contributions to our understanding of self-
organization. First, they demonstrated that self-organization is the norm, not an exception, 
in nature (Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989; Prigogine, 1996; Prigogine & 
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Stengers, 1984; Strogatz, 2003). Second, they identified a set of self-organizational mech-
anisms of the emergence of aggregate patterns or macro structures in animal and human 
societies (Axelrod, 1997; Holland, 1995; Strogatz, 2003). 
2. Ostrom’s Conceptualization of Self-Organization and its Foundations
Ostrom (2005) observes that most of the “contemporary policy recommendations” 
are based on the assumptions that governments are capable of objectively analyzing social 
problems, producing desired outcomes, and managing social resources and that people are 
not capable of managing themselves (p. 220). She counters these assumptions and argues 
that actually not all social problems can be solved centrally by governments and that peo-
ple are capable of organizing themselves to solve these problems. She and her colleagues 
demonstrated that individual actors have self-organizational capabilities, but there are also 
conditions that determine whether or not they will organize themselves. Ostrom identified 
and codified the conditions of self-organization in collective action processes, particularly 
in the management of common-pool resources. 
In her conceptualization of the conditions of self-organization, Ostrom draws pri-
marily on rational choice theory. Although she tried to distance herself from some of 
the assumptions of this theory, she remained committed to some of its core assumptions. 
Therefore, to understand the value of and the problems in Ostrom’s conceptualization, one 
needs to understand the assumptions and positions of rational choice theorists. 
Rational choice theorist challenge the liberal-democratic theory of government, 
particularly its proposition that public interest is determined or represented by public 
authorities, such as governments, who are populated by public servants whose actions are 
not self-seeking and who are capable of knowing what public interest is and act accord-
ingly to protect and promote it (Torfing, Peters, Pierre, & Sorensen, 2012, p. 149). In the 
liberal-democratic theory, “government” is viewed as a singular actor and a “policy” as an 
action taken by this actor. A policy is like an object that “impacts” a “target population” 
to generate an “outcome” (i.e., a policy causes an outcome, as in the Newtonian scientific 
image of external causation). Then the role of government’s policy analysts is to trace the 
trajectory of a policy action and check whether the outcome is compatible with the pre-
determined goal of the policy (for a classical example of this view of policy analysis, see 
Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman, 2004). 
Rational choice theorists argue that governments are not singular actors, that gov-
ernmental employees are self-seeking actors, just like all other individuals, and that pub-
lic interest is the aggregated outcome of the actions of all these self-seeking actors, not 
something protected or promoted by governmental actors only (Tullock, 1979, p. 31). In 
the rational choice view, public policies are collective outcomes of individual actions. 
Then the question is how do individual actions turn into collective outcomes? In answer-
ing this question, rational choice theorists make a set of simplifying assumptions. The 
limitations imposed by these assumptions are reflected in Ostrom’s conceptualizations, 
as I will demonstrate in the next section. 
The first simplifying assumption is that rational actors act in all economic, political, 
and other social arenas to maximize their utilities. This assumption has three components: 
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The preferences, interests, and actions of individual actors should be the basis of under-
standing any social and economic phenomenon (methodological individualism); the inter-
ests, values, tastes, and preferences of these utility maximizing actors are “fixed” in the 
sense that they do not have any individual histories or cultural affiliations that would affect 
the way they make their decisions (the fixed interest assumption); and individuals are self-
interested and utility maximizing rational actors (the utility maximization assumption) 
(MacDonald, 2003). The utility maximization assumption has been criticized by behav-
ioral and cognitive psychologists, who demonstrated that individuals cannot maximize 
their utilities because of the many cognitive biases and behavioral predispositions they 
have (Friedland & Robertson, 1990; Hogarth & Reder, 1986). Simon (1979, 1986) offered 
an alternative: Because humans have “ineradicable” cognitive limitations, their rational-
ity could only be “bounded.” A few scholars also criticized the fixed interest assumption. 
 Lichbach (2003, pp. 64–69), a proponent of rational choice, for example, argues that 
 rational choice theorists should acknowledge that because each individual has a history 
and his/her behaviors are influenced by culture, individual interests and preferences can-
not be not fixed. Methodological individualism is criticized rarely, and it remains the bed-
rock principle in rational choice theory and in Ostrom’s conceptualization. 
Although her thinking is rooted in the simplifying assumptions of rational choice 
theory, one can observe that there are tensions, nuances, and contradictions in Ostrom’s 
applications of them. Ostrom adopts Simon’s notion of bounded rationality (Ostrom, 
1990, p. 45; 2005, p. 118), but she also thinks that the assumption that individual actors 
try to fully maximize their utilities can still be useful in understanding economic markets 
and some other social situations (2005, pp. 99–133). She acknowledges that because of the 
different mental models individuals use and a variety of feedbacks they receive from the 
world and their shared culture (p. 105) and the emotional states they are in (pp. 112, 119), 
their interests, preferences, or behaviors cannot be fixed; they are complex and context-
dependent and the culture of a society and institutional structures constitute the context 
in which individuals make decisions and act (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 57–58; 2005, passim). 
However, in Ostrom’s framework these institutional structures function as external in-
ducements for action; they do not shape individual preferences or values (Ostrom & Parks, 
1999: p. 292). Because of this distinction between individual preferences and actions on 
the one hand and institutional structures on the other, Ostrom’s conceptualization is static, 
and thus problematic, as I discuss later in this paper. 
3. Conditions of Self-Organization in Common-Pool Resource Situations
Ostrom’s commitment to rational choice assumptions is reflected in her conceptu-
alization of the conditions of self-organization in the management of common-pool re-
sources (CPRs). She defines a CPR as a “natural or man-made resource system that is 
sufficiently large as to make costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries 
from obtaining benefits from its use” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 30). She focused on CPR situations 
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in her studies, because, she notes, the processes of self-organization and self- governance 
are easier to observe in them compared to many others (p. 29). 
Ostrom (1990) poses the following as the central question in understanding self- 
organization in the management of CPRs: “How [can] a group of principals who are in 
an interdependent situation…organize and govern themselves to obtain continuing joint 
benefit when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically”? 
(p. 29). The underlying assumption in this question is that all the individuals in CPR 
situations are self-seeking and boundedly rational actors who use a “calculus” to decide 
whether or not to engage in self-governance (pp. 245–247). 
Ostrom and her colleagues studied empirically the conditions under which these ac-
tors act and codified them. Ostrom identifies two sets of conditions that determine whether 
they will participate in self-organizational processes: those conditions that are conducive 
for individuals to begin governing themselves—what she calls the “attributes of resources 
and appropriators conducive to and increased likelihood that self-governing associations 
will form” (2005, pp. 244–245)—and those that will help them maintain self-governing 
institutions—what she calls the “design principles for long-enduring CPR institutions” 
(1990, p. 90) or the design principles for “long-enduring institutions for governing sus-
tainable resources” (2005, p. 259). 
According to Ostrom (2005), the attributes of resources that are conducive to appro-
priators’ self-organization are that there is a reasonable chance that the resources available 
to them can be improved, that there are sufficiently large resources and a good chance to 
improve them, that there are reliable and valid indicators of the conditions of resources 
available to appropriators at a relatively low cost, and that the resource system is suffi-
ciently small so that appropriators can develop accurate knowledge of the boundaries of 
the system (pp. 247–248). The attributes of appropriators that would enable them to par-
ticipate in self-governance in self-organization are that the CPR system is salient enough 
for their livelihood or their achievement of important social or religious values so that they 
will be motivated to self-organize, that they have sufficiently common understanding of 
the CPR system and how their actions will affect the system, that appropriators have “suf-
ficiently low discount rate” in relation to their future benefits and costs for participating in 
a self-governing system, that they trust each other for keeping promises and reciprocating 
their actions, appropriators have enough autonomy to carry out their actions vis-à-vis “ex-
ternal authorities” (governmental authorities), and they should have organizational experi-
ence and leadership skills gained from earlier experiences (pp. 248–251). 
Once a self-governing CPR system is established, it should be maintained. Ostrom 
formulated the conditions that would help self-governing CPR institutions to endure for 
a long period of time (1990, 90–102), which she later broadened to apply to all types 
of “socio-ecological systems” (2005, pp. 258–288). The compliance by participants of 
self-governing system should be enforced and monitored and trust and reciprocity levels 
among the participants are important factors that will determine the level of compliance 
with the rules. Ostrom (2005) observes that those systems in which participants select 
their own monitors of compliance—rather than external forces, such as governments,  do 
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that—are more likely to survive for long periods of time (p. 265), as well as those in which 
“graduated sanctions” applied to rule breakers and those that have mechanisms of conflict 
resolution (pp. 265–268). 
4. Ostrom and Complexity Theory 
Ostrom’s assumption that actors are capable of organizing themselves in collective ac-
tion processes resonates well with complexity theorists’ observation that self- organization 
is natural. The affinity between her conceptualizations and those of complexity theorists 
go beyond this general resonance. Particularly in her later writings and her Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech Ostrom acknowledged the contributions by complexity theorists and 
adopted some of their concepts (e.g., Ostrom, 2005, pp. 242–243, 256; 2007b; 2009). One 
might speculate about whether, when, and how complexity theory influenced her thinking. 
More important for the purpose of this paper is to acknowledge that with her conceptual-
izations and empirical findings, Ostrom demonstrated, directly and indirectly, that the con-
cepts of complexity theory can help advance our understanding of governance/ collective 
action processes. It is also important to highlight the parallels between her conceptual-
izations and those of complexity theorists, assess hers critically from the perspective of 
complexity theory, and draw lessons from them. 
One of Ostrom’s positions that bring her close to complexity thinking is her rejec-
tion of simplified dichotomies like governmental intervention versus free markets (2005, 
p. 256). She rejects the propositions that either free markets or governments can generate 
the best solutions to all social and economic problems. An important contribution she 
makes is to dispel the myths that free markets equal to self-governance and that self-
governance (or self-organization) is necessarily an egalitarian process. She points out that 
many studies demonstrated that local self-organization may be dominated by local elites 
(Ostrom, 2005, p. 220), for example. Ostrom also notes that although in many cases cen-
tralized governmental systems were not found to be as effective as locally self-organized 
common-pool resource governance systems, there is no common rule that would suggest 
that one or the other is always better (p. 222). She argues that there are different configura-
tions of relationships among governmental, nonprofit, and private actors that will generate 
different solutions to social problems and the best configuration of the roles of govern-
mental and other actors depends on the context (1990, pp. 8–15, 2009). 
She also observes that collective action processes take place in nested polycentric 
systems. Drawing on Vincent Ostrom’s (1999a, 1999b) earlier conceptualizations of poly-
centric systems, Ostrom (2005) observes that when common-pool resources are larger 
than the boundaries of a local community, many organizational actors will be involved 
and this will create “multiple layers of nested enterprises” (p. 270). In these multi-layered 
systems, not only there are multiple organizations and actors involved, such as general-
purpose and special-purpose governments and local community organizations, but also 
the authorities and functions of these organizations are layered: Some have more general 
authorities and functions than others. These polycentric governance systems are complex 
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adaptive systems, and as such, they should adapt to their environments by reconfiguring 
their components in order to maintain their desired system characteristics for a long period 
of time (p. 258). 
She also notes that there are no simple, definitive, or universal rules that govern these 
systems, because we will always have incomplete knowledge of them and their relations 
with larger systems (p. 284). Although she makes some generalizations about the “design 
principles” of self-organizing systems, as summarized in the previous section, she notes 
that there are many areas in which no conclusive design principles can be devised. There-
fore, a better approach is to develop a configurational understanding of these systems, to 
identify specific configurations of the variables for particular conditions, rather than trying 
to find out the optimal conditions for self-organization (p. 254). Because all our analyses 
and knowledge of systems are partial, we should design our institutions adaptively (p. 254).
Having noted the parallels between Ostrom’s thinking and complexity theory, I also 
should point out a major problematic area in her conceptualizations. As I mentioned ear-
lier in this paper, Ostrom remained committed to some of the basic assumptions of rational 
choice theory. Because of this commitment, the conditions of self-organization she identi-
fied reflect a static conceptualization. 
What is particularly problematic in this assumption is its methodological individual-
ist element. Methodological individualists assume that individual behavior is a distinct 
and the only legitimate unit of analysis. Although they may recognize that social structures 
exist, as Ostrom does, in their conceptualization either these structures have independent 
existence from the behaviors of individuals, or they fail to explain how the social and in-
dividual processes may be related. 
In Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework, individual actors act 
in “action arenas,” which social structures are created by external forces (e.g., govern-
ments) (2005, pp. 14–15). There are also “exogenous variables,” such as biophysical and 
material conditions, attributes of community (culture), and various rules set at different 
tiers of social existence. These rules are set for “operational,” “collective-choice,” “consti-
tutional,” and “meta-constitutional situations” (pp. 58–62). Ostrom uses the term “institu-
tions” for these rule sets and action areas. It is important to stress that all these rule sets and 
action areas exist independently of individual actors in her conceptualization. Ostrom and 
Parks (1999) specifically mention that these institutions are external to individual decision 
makers; they function as external inducements for action and they do not shape individual 
preferences or values (p. 292). 
Methodological individualism is evident also in Ostrom’s descriptions of the condi-
tions of self-organization in CPR systems. As I summarized in the previous section, in 
her conceptualization individual actors are utility maximizing individuals who make cost-
benefit calculations to such an extent that they calculate “discount rates” to make decisions 
whether or not to participate in a self-governing CPR system. She defines even “trust” in 
terms of the “expected cost” of one individual trusting another one. Although she agrees 
with Simon’s proposition that individuals do not have the cognitive capabilities to be fully 
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rational, they still are “boundedly rational” (i.e., imperfectly calculating actors), according 
to Ostrom. 
Then, where do the interests, tastes, preferences, and values of these calculating 
individuals come from? Institutions do not shape them (Ostrom & Parks, 1999). Is there 
anything else that shapes them? Do the personal histories of individual actors shape them, 
for example? Rational choice theorists have been criticized for assuming that the interests, 
values, tastes, and preferences of actors are “fixed” in the sense that they do not have any 
individual histories or cultural affiliations that would affect the way they make their deci-
sions (MacDonald, 2003), as I mentioned earlier in this paper. Ostrom’s writings are not 
clear on whether she thinks that they are fixed. As I discussed in the previous section, she 
describes the “attributes of appropriators” that are conducive to making them participate in 
self-governance and by doing so she acknowledges that there are variations among actors. 
This acknowledgement might imply that their interests, values, etc. are shaped by their 
individual histories. However, she does not discuss specifically where the variations in the 
“attributes of appropriators” come from. 
Because of the implicit, or explicit, assumption that the interests and values of in-
dividuals are fixed, Ostrom’s framework is static. She ignores the dynamics of the rela-
tionships between individuals and social structures (e.g., institutions). The nature and 
dynamics of micro–macro relationships is a core problem for complexity researchers who 
study social systems in general, and policy/governance systems in particular (Göktug˘ 
Morçöl, 2012b). In complexity theory, macro structures (the properties of a system) 
emerge from the relationships at the micro level and in turn they can help shape the rela-
tionships at the micro level. In other words, the micro and macro levels are interdependent 
(e.g., culture and individuals’ behaviors and interests are interdependent). This is why a 
researcher has to understand not only the properties of the components (e.g., individual 
actors), but also those of the system (e.g., institutions) and the dynamic relationships 
between the two (Göktug˘ Morçöl, 2012a, chapter 3).
Cilliers’s (1998) conceptualization of self-organization is a good example of the 
dynamic understanding complexity theorists put forth. According to Cilliers, “The capac-
ity of self-organization is a property of complex systems which enables them to develop 
or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or ma-
nipulate, their environment” (p. 90). In other words, a self-organizing system not only re-
acts to it environment, but also transforms itself through interactions with its environment 
(p. 108). “Self-organization is a self-transforming process; the system acts upon itself” 
(p. 108). The degree of openness of a system to its environment and the degrees to which 
the environment can influence the system and the system can influence the environment 
are open questions for complexity researchers (Göktug˘ Morçöl, 2012a, pp. 115–119). 
Another set of conceptual and empirical problems complexity researchers dealt with 
were about the boundaries of self-organizing complex systems and how the “self” should 
be defined in them. Ostrom (2005) states that how the boundaries of CPR systems is an 
important problem (p. 248), but she does not provide an answer to it. Complexity research-
ers aim to understand how boundaries of self-organizing complex systems are formed. 
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Rhodes, Murphy, Muir, and Murray’s (2011) conceptualizations of the dynamics of set-
ting and re-setting the geo-political boundaries in the urban regeneration and healthcare 
systems in Ireland and Northern Ireland are good examples (pp. 134–147). Applying two 
complexity theory concepts, path dependency and bifurcation, they demonstrate that the 
urban boundaries in Belfast and Dublin were set and changed over time, both geographi-
cally and politically, based on the histories of the neighborhoods in these cities. 
If systems are composed of other systems and all systems are related to other sys-
tems, then how can we define the “self” in self-organizational processes? In Moreno and 
Ruiz-Mirazo’s (2007) conceptualization, a system’s components define themselves as a 
system from which emerges the notion of self. In describing the process of defining self, 
they use the term “self-encapsulation”: sharply differentiating the organization of the 
 system—the set of relations that constitute it as a distinct unity—from the environment. 
By establishing a distinct set of relationships among themselves, a group of elements 
define a system, a self, according to Moreno and Ruiz-Mirazo. The best example of this 
is the process of developing the membrane of a living cell: Through self-encapsulation, a 
group of molecules become a cell.
In social systems self is defined through social construction processes, according 
to Gerrits (2008) and Gerrits, Marks, and van Buuren (2009). Complex social systems 
are defined jointly by their participants and their observers (researchers) these authors 
point out, and they illustrate this point with examples from the Netherland and Germany. 
This social constructionist approach is insightful but not adequate, because it may imply 
that social systems are merely the products of the conjectures of their participants and/or 
observers and that a social system is merely an imaginary entity that exists in some indi-
viduals’ minds; also it does not adequately consider the dynamics of defining selves and 
systems. Complexity researchers need to develop better conceptualizations, in my view. 
Giddens’ (1984) view that systems are not imaginary entities, but they are “situated activi-
ties of human agents, reproduced across time and space” (p. 25) is a better conceptualiza-
tion, as I argued elsewhere (Göktug˘ Morçöl, 2012a).
An important area of conceptualization and research in complexity studies is the 
nature of self-organizing agents. Whether they self-encapsulate or socially construct 
their identities to form a system, agents should have the capacity to do so. Teisman, van 
Buuren, and Gerrits (2009) point out that human agents have self-reflexive capacities 
and that “Self-organization is the reflexive capacity of actors and (sub)systems who are 
able to  receive, encode, transform and store information and use this to consider actions” 
(p. 9). In other words, self-organization requires some information processing capacity by 
 reflexive actors. 
Whether agents must indeed have self-reflexive capacities for them to be able to self-
organize is an unsettled issue in complexity theory. The larger question is whether or not 
intelligence or knowledge is a precondition for self-organization. This question is closely 
related to the issue of the rationality, or bounded rationality, of actors. Complexity theorists 
identified two kinds of agents: “cognitive agents” and “reactive agents.”  Cognitive agents 
are intentional and deliberative; they have “internal models,” or “schema,” which helps 
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them anticipate future events and thus guide their actions (Holland, 1995, pp. 31–34). 
Cognitive agents are similar to boundedly rational actors, who can process information 
and make predictions into future, which help them guide their actions. Reactive agents do 
not have any internal models to guide their actions; they merely react to their immediate 
environmental conditions. 
For complexity researchers the question is does self-organization require cognitive 
agents, or could reactive agents self-organize as well? Several researchers used agent-based 
simulations (ABS) to answer these questions. In some of these ABS studies, researchers 
demonstrated the self-organizational capabilities of cognitive agents (e.g.,  Ahmad, 2008; 
Castelfranchi, 1998; Naveh & Sun, 2006) or boundedly rational agents (e.g., Axelrod, 
1997; Bednar & Page, 2007; Cohen, Riolo & Axelrod, 2001; Epstein, 2006; Holland, 
1995; Miller & Page, 2007). As Sawyer (2005) notes, however, other researchers dem-
onstrated that self-organizational processes can occur even when there are only reactive 
agents and objective structures can emerge from the interactions of such agents (p. 161). 
Epstein and Axtell (1996) demonstrated, for example, that identifiable social structures 
can emerge from the interactions of artificial reactive agents that have limited knowledge 
of their environments and limited capabilities to react. The question of whether, or to what 
extent, cognitive capabilities (or rationality) are needed for self-organization is still an 
open question for complexity theorists and researchers. 
Although she does not discuss this explicitly, Ostrom’s conceptualization seems 
to imply that self-organizational processes yield more organization and orderliness in 
collective action processes. The conceptual problems she poses are whether and how 
self- regulating orderly regimes emerge through self-organization in CPR situations. Com-
plexity theorists show that the direction of self-organization may be toward more (higher 
levels of) organization and orderliness or toward disorderliness. According to Anderson 
(1999) complex systems organize themselves toward order (p. 218). Prigogine, on the 
other hand, shows that self-organizational processes may go in either direction. In his 
view, systems spontaneously evolve toward “far from equilibrium” conditions under 
which there are two possibilities: Either systemic properties break down (disorderliness), 
or new systemic properties emerge (orderliness) (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Nicolis & 
Prigogine, 1989; Prigogine, 1996). Prigogine’s conceptualization of the two directions 
in self-organizational processes has implications for understanding governance/collective 
action processes. It can help researchers of these processes to conceptualize the emergence 
of failures and undesirable outcomes in such actions (disorderliness), as well as the emer-
gence of successes and desirable outcomes (orderliness). 
5. Conclusions
There is a major lesson in Ostrom’s development of her Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework for complexity researchers: In order for complexity theory to 
become a viable alternative in policy/governance/collective action studies, complex-
ity researchers would need to take Ostrom’s example of meticulous theory building and 
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empirical verification as an example. The Institutional Analysis and Development frame-
work has been recognized as the most developed of the theoretical frameworks explaining 
policy processes and the most widely applied framework in the United States and Europe 
(Sabatier, 2007, p. 9). Ostrom’s contributions, which are encapsulated in this framework, 
were recognized with a Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 (Ostrom, 2009). Ostrom’s pub-
lications are among the the most frequently cited works. (A Google Scholar search in May 
of 2014, when this paper was written, yielded 77776 citations of her works, compared to 
Albert Einstein’s 94081 citations.) 
All in all it is clear that Ostrom’s framework made significant impacts in the schol-
arly literature, which would be difficult to emulate, but it can be an example for the fu-
ture works of complexity researchers. Complexity researchers should take the theoretical 
articulation of their concepts seriously. I proposed elsewhere that there already are two 
theoretical frameworks that are emerging within complexity studies: the micro-macro 
framework and the socio-ecological systems framework (Göktug˘ Morçöl, 2014). The con-
cepts of these frameworks need to be refined and empirically verified in future studies. 
In doing so, complexity researchers could consider adopting and adapting Ostrom’s 
conditions of self-organization. However, the researchers should keep in mind the limi-
tations posed by the roots of Ostrom’s framework in rational choice theory. Because of 
her loyalty to methodological individualism, her framework is static. Her descriptions 
of the layers of this framework and the relationships among them are conceptually and 
mathematically sophisticated, but they lack a conceptualization of the dynamics of these 
relationships. This deficiency can be seen clearly in her descriptions of the conditions of 
self-organization, particularly the attributes of resources and actors that are required for 
self-organization. In these descriptions, actors and social structures are conceptualized as 
distinct entities. She does not consider the effects of the interactions between actors and 
socials structures and possible transforming effects of one on the other. 
As I pointed out in the previous section, complexity researchers have already con-
ceptualized, and investigated to some degree, various aspects of the dynamics of micro–
macro interactions, but most of these conceptualizations lack the specificity of Ostrom’s 
conceptualization of the conditions of self-organization in CPR situations. Ostrom’s con-
ditions could be reconsidered and re-conceptualized from a complexity theory perspec-
tive. For example, it could be asked whether utility maximization, as Ostrom suggests, 
or social construction is the primary force that determines the decisions of the appropria-
tors of common-pool resources to self-organize. If the existence of “cognitive agents” is 
not a necessary condition for self-organizational processes to occur (reactive agents can 
self-organize as well), to what extent do appropriators need certain kinds of information 
(information about feasibility of improvement, reliability and validity of indicators, pre-
dictability of future outcomes, etc.) to self-organize? How do path dependencies affect 
appropriators’ perceptions of the boundaries of common-pool resource systems? 
Self-organization is an important concept that can help us rectify the Newtonian 
external cause–effect way of thinking, which dominates contemporary policy analysis. 
The philosophical debates on whether events are caused externally or internally have a 
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long history, as I noted in this paper. These debates have affected the thinking in studies 
on policy, governance, and collective action processes. In general the Newtonian external 
cause–effect thinking permeated most of the conceptualizations and empirical studies in 
these areas. Ostrom and complexity researchers not only demonstrated that policy/gover-
nance/collective action processes can be self-organizational, but they also identified the 
conditions and mechanisms of self-organization in them. 
Elizabeth Ostrom’s and her colleagues’ contributions in this area are substantial, but 
they have shortcomings as well. With their systemic and dynamic understanding of natural 
and social phenomena, complexity theorists can build a better framework of understand-
ing how complex governance networks work. 
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